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No. 73-786 Cert to CA 4 
(Haynsworth, Craven, Butzner) 
ROSS (N. Carolina) 
V 
Federal/ Habeas corpus -----
MOFFITT (prisoner) Timely 
1. Resp was convicted of forgery and uttering a forged 
instrument in Mecklenburg County, N.C. With the assistance 
N,( .. 
of appointed counsel, he ap[;Caled to the I\Ct App which affirmed 
his conviction. llis counsel~informed him that the court would - ~ -----
not appoint him to represent resp to file a petn for cert in '-~-------- -------- -
the N.C. SC. Resp sought to prepare his own petn which was ---
denied because of .a ~iness. After exhausting his state post-
conviction rem··dies, resp fil<~d a writ of HC in USDC W.D. N.C. 




Resp was also convict~d in Guilford County, N.C of 
forgery and uttering a forged instrument, With the assistance 
of the public defender he appealed to the Ct App NC which 
affirmed his conviction, The public defender was authorized 
r 
to prepare and file a petn of cert in the SC of N.C. The - . 
state AG's motion to dismiss on the ground that no substantial 
constitutional question was presented was granted, Resp 
unsuccessfully sought in the superior court and the ct app 
, • ~ I 
to have counsel appqinted to file a cert petn to this Court, 
Resp then sought habeas corpu~ relief in USDC M.D, N.C. and 
upon denial of relief there, appealed to the CA-4, 
2, REASONING OF THE CA 4s The Mecklenburg and Guilford 
convictions were joined in a single opinion in the CA. The 
court prefaced its opinion with the statement that this case 
t-- ------ - -- --....__ 
presen~ed t he issue reser~d in Douglas v California, 372 ------ -------- - ------US 353, the constitutional right to appointed counsel for an ---------------------- -
indigent criminal defendant in a discretionary or permissive ------~------.....----- ""-- ---- -
appeal. 
The CA noted that N.C. law provided for an appeal of right 
from the superior court to the ct app, but there was an appeal 
. -
of right to th9 highest state court only in cases involving 
r---..:::::.._ _____ ....... -----------
a substantial constitutional question or where the criminal ______________ -._.:_ _____ _
sentence is death or life imprisonment. In cases like the 
present one there was only a discretionary right of review 
by
1
the state · sc, The CA also mentioned that in the Guilford 
conviction re s p had been appointed counsel to file a cert petn 
to the NC SC whereas in the Mecklenburg conviction counsel . 
had been denied. The court concluded that there were no 
3 
guidelines to be followed by state judges, However, the 
court found that the record was insufficient for a finding 
that the administration of the NC statutes effected a denial ...____ 
of equal protection to some indigent appellants, 
The court reasoned that it was continuing where Douglas 
II 
left off and that there was"no logical basis for differentiation 
between appeals of right and permissive review procedures in 
th~ context of the Constitution and the right to[counsel," 
-----Discretionary r~view procedures, are necessary for courts to 
control , their dockets, but "conversion by a state from a single 
tier appellate syste~ to a double tier system, however, does 
not alter the fact that the state's highest court remains the 
ultimate arbiter of the rights of its citizens," If, as 
Douglas holds, deprivation of counsel to an_ indigent seeking 
appeal of a felony conviction to an inter mediate court "so dilutes 
the quali~y of justice that it amounts to a deprivation of 
due process or equal protection, de~ial of counsel as he seeks 
access to the state's highest court would seem a similar and 
. L • 
comparable depriva~ion," 
The CA asknowledged that its opinion conflicted with 
Pennington v Pag, 409 F2d 757 (CA 7, 1969) and Peters· v Cox, 
341 F,2d 575 (CA 10 1965), The court stated that times change 
and what is requisite today may . not have been required ten 
The court cities the Betts-
] 
y~ars ago or even a few years ago, 
Gideon-Argerst nger development, The court concluded that the 
result they rea ched was consistent with R,Qugla~: 
"The majority opinion [in Douglas] talks in terms of 
equality. If the holding be grounded on the equal 











protection clause, inequality in the circumstances of 
these cases is as obvious as it was in the circumstances 
of Douglas, If the holding in Douglas were grounded on 
the due process clause,,,due process encompasses elements 
of equality. There simply cannot be due process of 
law to a litigant deprived of all professional assist-
ance when other litigants, similarly situated, are able 
to obtain professional assistance and to be benefited 
by it~ (CA op, petn appx. 21-22) 
The court held that an indigent criminal defendant with a 
federal claim must be provided with legal assistance in taking 
a~iscretionary appeal (the preparation of a cert petn to this 
C~t or a state appellate court), The court emphasized that 
nothing said in the opinion has 11 application tn any collateral, 
civil proceeding, though it may call into question the validity 
of a previous criminal conviction. 11 
The Mecklenburg case was remanded to the DC with instructions 
to issue the writ of habeas corpus, unless within a reasonable 
time, NC shal l provide resp with the assistance of counsel 
to file a cert petn to the state SC, and provided that court 
shall receive the petn and not dismiss it as untimely, The 
Guilford case was remanded to the DC with directions to 
examine the contentions made by resp in the SC of NC and to 
grant the writ of habeas corpus, i.f, in the SC of NC, resp 
asserted a substantial federal question revicwable by this 
Court on a writ of cert. The court added that"ordinarily an 
inferior court should not withhold counsel because it thinks 
a particular question reviewable by a higher appellate court 
, 
lacks substantiality", but in . the circumstances of this case 
where the issu~ a ri ses in a HC proceeding and~the only remedy 
••• 
availableAwould be the prisoner's release.,,we think it approp-
riate," 
,I 
, ' ,. 
Ci • .. 
5 
3. CONTENTIONS, Petr State of N.C. contends that the 
petn should be granted because the CA opinion conflicts with 
this Court's opinion in Douglas and the Pennington · and Cox 
cases. It is asserted that the CA decision raises serious 
problems affecting the structure of criminal justice. Counsel 
will have to be provided in the second tier of discretionary 
review in a multi-tier system or beyond the appeal as of right 
in a single-tier system; counsel must be provid_ed in al 1 petns 
for cert. to this Court. The 1mpact .of this holding upon 
state and federal courts is obvious. 
The resp contends that this is simply the logical extension 
of~·Douglas and that the Pennington and CO2£ cases were prior 
to this Court's opinion in Argersinger. Therefore, any 
conflict is "merely illusory." 
4. DISCUSSION: The question i s obviously of considerable 
importance and the conflict is real. Assuming the CA opinion -
is correct, the petn still warrants plenary review by this 
Court. 
There is a response and an amicus curiae brief in support 
of the petn by the State of Virginia. 
12/11/73 Sharp CA 4 op in petn appx. 
.. '\., 
Conference 1-4-74 
CA - 4 
Court Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 73-786 
Bubmitteit ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
FRED R. ROSS AND NORTH CAROLINA, Petitioners 
vs. 
CLAUDE FRANKLIN MOFFITT 
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20, 1974 Owens 
No. 73-786 Ross v. Moffitt 
This case presents the issue whether the right to 
appointed • counsel extends to discretionary appellate 
review (sometimes referred to as the second appeal). In 
essence, the question is • whether an indigent has a right 
to the assistance of counsel in the preparation of a cert 
petition, when that petition is to be presented to the highest 
state court or this .. Court. 
It is important to understand the North Carolina system 
for appointing counsel • in criminal cases for the purposes 
of appellate review. Judge Haynsworth describes this with 
clarity, and you should be sure to have that under your 
uo-le.. 
belt before you In NC, there is a right of direct 
.:.;:_ - a,=-
appe~l to the highest state court in all criminal cases in 
which the sentence is death (at the moment there are no such 
cases, due to Furman) or life imprisonment. In all other 
cases, there is an ~omatic _r~ght of app~ to the intermediate 
state appellate courts. There is then a furhher automatic --
right of appeal to the highest state 1111at court in noncapital 
----- rl) 
cases ifl:he case raises a substantial question of federal · -or state constitutional law (this determination is apparently -
)
m~de • b; the intermediate appellate court--you should attempt 
- k'" 
---- / to clarify this at oral a~gument) or if there is a dissent 
at the intermediate appellate court. If there is no substantial 
question or no dissent, review in the highest state court is 
discretionary--apparently the system is very similar to a 
petition for cert in this Court. 
Whenever state law provides an automatic r* of appeal, 
it also provides for appointed counsel in preparing 
* S ~ ~ IV, C , ~ 7-l~  
- <.., ~ • ~ ~ ..,) a..- ~, c~. cp 
-2-
fl>ft!-YJ. 
the appeal --•• and in arguing the appeal. Fuithermore, 
if the highest state court grants a cert petition, it 
apparently provides counsel to argue the case. What is ---- - ,., 
at issue here is whether counsel ought to be provided to --
prepare a petition for cert. Due to the facts of this case, 
• T comes up not only with regard to cert -7!)that issue 
before the NC SC but also before this 6'ourt. 
This is a state criminal defendant seeking cert before 
this Court (as well as before the state SC in another criminal 
case). To date, this Court has not required the 
assistance of counsel for indigents in seeking cert from 
~te criminal convictions. But apparently the law has 
developed to the point that a 9 A petitioner seeking 
review from the affirmance of a federal conviction must 
have the assistance of appointed counsel. This is a 
result of the 1970 amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 
of 196f. See Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28 (1971), 
which you must review before you vote in this case. There 
the Court did not explicityy decide the issue--rether it 
remanded the question PC to the CAs to let them decide it 
in the first instance. But Justice Douglas filed a concurring 
opinion in which he expressed the view that the « 1970 amendment 
means that a federal criminal cl 7 a def end ant, if indigent, 
/ 
must have the assistance of counsel tn the preparation of a 
cert petition. So, today we may have a g tr system under 
which federal fl i : criminal defendants get appointed 
counsel in preparing cert petitions to this Court, but state 
C.\rt"''~J 
c L 1 ?)\defendants do not. That disparfilYy is a product of 
a federal statute, assuming that Justice Douglas ha) read the 
federal statute correctly. 
-3-
With regard to deciding the abstract issue presented 
by this case (does the right to counsel extend to discretionary 
review, where counsel has been provided on the first, or 
automatic, appeal), your vote is controlled by your separate 
opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 40i U.S. 25 (1972), and 
by ·- Rodriguez. (Be sure to reread Argersinger before voting.) 
But there is an underbrush issue here that may decide the 
case without regard to how the Court comes out on the main 
issue. I will deal with the underbrush issue last. 
Due Process considerations. 
It is impossible to tell whether the key case here, 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), is a due process 
case or an equal protection case. (Douglas held that appointed 
couasel must be provided on the first, or automatic, appeal. 
It reserved tre question presented here.) This explains 
why Juege Haynsworth in the opinion below waffles on revealing 
the • constitutional clause that underlies his result. The ,~.,.. 
author of the Douglas opinion, J. Douglas, 1 the issue 
mnrky. J. Harlan, joined in dissent by J. Stewart, said it 
had to be due process. This is probably right, but the Court --------- -
j 
in this case will have to address both due process and equal 
pef.t}ection. 
Your due process position is established by your opinion 
~ 
in Argersinger. The Q~t to have appoi.)tted counsel varies in 
direct r~lationship to the importance of counsel to the task --at hand. Under that standard, there is no., requirement for --
appointed counsel here. NC has adopted a rational system for 
. I 
-4-
screening cases to isolate those where counsel is trul~ - r- - ....__ -
required--those cases in which the state grants an automatic 
right of appeal to the highest state court. And in those 
cases the state grants counsel. If a case is not important 
enough to be certified as raising a substttial question or 
to provoke a dissent at the intermediate court of appeals, 
C. 
then the challJ\es that it is of any moment are remote and 
the need for counsel is not very great (particularly since 
counsel • has already taken part in presenting the case to 
the intermediate court of appeals). 
Equal Protection considerations. 
Wealthy defendants presumably retain counsel for all 
cert petitons. As a matter of equal protection, must the 
state therefore extend counsel to all indigents? No. The 
) s:~te has no affirmative duty to eliminate economic- disparities, 
in the absence of a suspect classification (and wealth 
is not a suspect classification--Rodriguez) or the infringemeryt 
of a fundamental right. The right to counsel is a fundamental 
right, but that right can be found to exist here only i i the 
above due process question is decided contrary to the way you 
would decide it under your Argersinger approach. The Equal 
Protection clause does not create the reght, be~se as you 
*2.1 : said in Rodriguez it is not the office of the Court 
to create fundamental rights in the name of extending equal -
protection of the law. The state has extendmd the right 
to seek cert to all, regardless of wealth. Since no fundamental -
right or suspect class is at issue, there is no equal protection --violation. Certainly the system is not irrational, either, 
as noted above. 
... 
-5-
Yick Wo--Egual Protection as-applied, 
Be sure to note the early portion of J. HaynsworthQs 
opinion, where he talks about a submerged issue lurking in 
the case, Although there is, under state law, no requirement 
to appoint counsel on cert petitions, apparently as a matter 
of practice counsel are sometimes appointed. The record 
apparently does not permit a determination of when this 
happens, how often, for what reason, etc. If the state is 
extending counsel as a sometine thing, that may well be 
irrational under traditional equal protection analysis. No 
mattefow this case comes out in principle, it probably 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm3 
No. 73-786 
Fred R. Ross and North 
Carolina, Petitioners, 
v. 
Claude Franklin Moffit. 
On Writ of Certiorari t6 thij 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, 
[June .._, 1974] 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
W c are asked in this case to decide whether Douulas v. 
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), which requires appoint• 
rnent of counsel for indigent state defendants on their 
first appeal as of right, should be extended to require 
counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applica-
tions for review in this Court. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that such appointment was 
required. by the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
I 
The case now before us has resulted from consolidation 
of two separate cases, North Carolina criminal prosecu .. 
tions brought in the respective circuit courts for the 
counties of Mecklenburg and Guilford. In both cases 
respondent pled not guilty to charges of forgery and 
uttering a forged instrument, and because of his indi-
gency was represented at trial by court-appointed coun .. 
sel. He then took separate appeals to the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, where he was again repre-




ROSS v. MOFFITT 
sented by court-appointed counsel, and his convictions 
were affirmed. 2 At this point the procedural histories 
of the two cases diverge. 
Following affirmance of his Mecklenburg County con-
viction, respondent sought to invoke the discretionary 
review procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court. 
His court-appointed counsel approached the Mecklen-
burg County Superior Court about possible appointment 
to represent respondent on this appeal, but counsel was 
informed that the State was not required to furnish 
counsel for that petition. Respondent sought collateral 
relief in both the state and federal courts, first raising 
his right to counsel contention in a habeas corpus petition 
filed in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of North Carolina in February 1971. Relief was 
denied at time, and respondent's appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was dismissed by stipula-
tion in order to allow respondent to first exhaust state 
remedies on this issue. After exhausting state remedies, 
he reapplied for habeas relief, which was again denied. 
Respondent appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit. 
Following his conviction on the Guilford County 
charges, respondent also sought discretionary review in 
the North Carolina Supreme Court. On this appeal, 
however, respondent was not denied counsel but rather 
was represented by the public defender who had been 
appointed for the trial and respondent's first appeal. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari.3 
Respondent then unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior 
Court for Guilford County and the North Carolina Court 
2 Stale v. Mojfiitt, 9 N. C. App. 694, 177 S. E. 2d 234 (1970) 
(Mecklenburg); State v. Moffitt, 11 N. C. App. 337, 181 S. E . 2d 
184 (1971) (G11ilford) . 
8 8tate r , M offitl , 279 N C. 3!.lG, 183 S E. 2d 2-!7 (1971) . 
,-
; 
ROSS v. MOFF!TT 
of Appeals for court-..appointetl ~u\1s~l t~ pr~pa~ a writ 
of certiorari to this C~urt, Aft~r tMs~ m{)tioni were 
tlenied, respondent again sought federal habeas reliefi 
this time in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of North Carolina. That court d~nied 
relief, and respondent took an appeal to the Court t.lf 
Appeals for the Fourth Circul.t, 
The Court of Appeals reversed the two District Court 
judgments, holding that respondent was entitled to tM 
assistance of counsel at state expense both on his petition 
for review in the North Carolina Supreme Court and on 
his petition for review in this Court. Reviewing the pro-
cedures of the North Carolina appellate system and the 
possible benefits that counsel would provide for indigents 
seeking review in that system, the court istat~d: 
"As long as the state provides such procedures and 
allows other convicted felons to seek access to the 
higher court with the help of retained counsel, there 
is a marked absence of fairness in denying an indi• 
gent the assistance of counsel as he seeks access to 
the same court." ' 
This principle was held equally applicable to petitions 
for review in this Court. For, said the Court of Appealsi 
"[t]he same concepts of fairness and equality, which 
require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel 
in other and subsequent discretionary appeals." 6 
4 483 F . 2d, at 654. 
5 4&1 F 2d, at 655. The court then derided to remand the case 
to the District Court to "appraise the substantiality of the federal 
claun.'' The court noted that it had no opportunity to examine the 
paper~ filed in the Statr Suprrme Court and said that. '' [i]n the rir-
cum;;tance~ of th1:,; ca::;e . , . where the only remedy available to 
the District Court would be the pri:,;oner':,; release on a writ of habeas 
corpus," it wa:,; appropriate for 1he District Court to determine 





ROSS v '\JOFFITT 
·we granted certiorari, - U. S. -, to consider the 
Court of Appeals' decision in light of Dour;las v. Cali-
fornia, supra, and apparC'ntly conflicting decisions of the 
Court of Appeals for the 8eventh and Tenth Circuits." 
For the reasons hereafter stated we reverse the Court of 
Appeals. 
JI 
This Court, in the past 20 years, has given extensive 
consideration to the rights of indigent persons on appeal. 
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), the first of 
the pertinent cases, the Court had before it an Illinois 
rule allowing a convicted criminal defendant to present 
claims of trial error to the Supreme Court of Illinois only 
if he procured a transcript of the testimony adduced at 
his trial.1 No exception was made for the indigent 
defendant, and thus one who was unable to pay the cost 
of obtaining such a transcript was precluded from obtain-
ing appellate review of asserted trial error. Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, who cast the deciding vote, said in his con-
curring opinion : 
" ... Illinois has decreed that only defendants who 
can afford to pay for the stenographic minutes of 
a trial may have trial errors reviewed on appeal by 
the Illinois Supreme Court." 351 U. S., at 22. 
The Court i11 Griffin held that this discrimination vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Succeeding cases invalidated similar financial barriers 
to the appellate process, at the same time reaffirming the 
traditional principle that a State is not obliged to provide 
any appeal at all for criminal defendants. McKane v. 
Durston, 153 P . S. 684 (1894). The cases encompassed 
n See Pennington v. Pate, 409 F. 2d 757 (CA7) ; Peters v. Cox, 
341 F . 2d 575 (CAlO) . 
7 See 351 U. S., at 13 n 2. 
,-
73-786-0PINION 
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a, variety of circumstances but all had a common theme. 
For example, Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963), 
involved an Indiana provision declaring that <mly a 
public defender could obtain a free transcript gf a hear-
ing on a coram nobis application. If the public defender 
declined to request one, the indigent prisoner seeking to 
appeal had no recourse. In Draper v. Washington, 37,2 
U. S. 487 (1963), the State permitted an indigent to 
obtain a free transcript of the trial at which he was 
convicted only if he satisfied the trial judge that his 
contentions on appeal would not be frivolous. The 
appealing defendant was in effect bound by the trial 
court's conclusions in seeking to review the determina-
tion of frivolousness, since no transcript or its equivale1'lt 
was made available to him. In Smith v . . Bennett, 365 
U. S. 708 ( 1961), Iowa had required a filing fee in order 
' to process a state habeas corpus application by a con-
victed defendant, and in Burm v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 
( 1959), the State of Ohio required a $20 filing fee in 
order to move the Supreme Court of Ohio for leave to 
appeal from a judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals 
affirming a criminal conviction. Each of these state-
imposed financial barriers to the adjudication of a crimi-
nal defendant's appeal was held to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
These decisions discussed above stand for the proposi:. 
tion that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights 
for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for 
more affluent persons. In Douglas v. California, 372 
U. S. 353 (1963), however, a case decided the same day 
as Lane and Draper, supra, the Court departed somewhat 
from the limited doctrine of the transcript and fee cases 
and undertook an examination of whether an indigent's 
access to the appellate system was adequate. The Court 
',;t-,Sn-OPJNTO~ 
Cl noss /) , MOFFTTT 
in Douglas concluded that a State does not fulfill its 
responsibility towards indigent defendants merely by 
waiving its own requirements that a convicted defendant 
procure a transcript or pay a fee in order to appeal, and 
held that the State must go further and provide counsel 
for the indigent on his first appeal as of right. !t is 
this decision we are asked to extend today. 
Petitioners in Douglas, each of whom had been conM 
victed by a jury 011 13 felony counts, took appeals as 
of right to the California District Court of Appeal. No 
filing fee was exacted of them, no transcript was required 
in order to present their arguments to the Court of 
Appeals, and the appellate process was therefore OJ)en 
to them. Petitioners, however, claimed that they not 
oruyhad the right to make use of the appellate process, 
but that they were entitled to court-appointed and state-
compensated counsel because they were indigent, The 
California appellate court parsed the trial record on its 
own initiative, following the then existing rule in Cali-
\ 
fornia, and concluded that "no good whatever could be 
served by appointment of counsel." 372 U. S., at 355. 
It therefore denied petitioners' request for the appoint-
ment of counsel. 
j 
This Court held unconstitutional California's require-
ment that counsel on appeal would be appointed for an 
indigent only if the appellate court determined that such 
appointment would be helpful to the defendant or to the 
court itself, The Court noted that under this system 
an indigent's case was initially reviewed on the merits 
without the benefit of any organization or argument by 
counsel. By contrast, persons of greater means were not 
faced with the preliminary "ex parte examination of the 
record," 372 U. S .. at 356, but had their arguments pre-
sented to the Court iu fully briefed form. The Court 
73-78&-0PINION 
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noted, however, that its decision extended onl to initial 
appeals as of right, an wen on o say: 
"We need not now decide whether California would 
have to provide counsel for an i11digent s~eking a 
discretionary hearing from the California Supreme 
Court after the District Court of Appeal had sus .. 
tained his conviction ... or whether counsel must 
be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an 
appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court 
by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ 0£ 
certiorari which lies within the Court's discretion, 
But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, 
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, pro~ 
vide for differences so long as the result does not 
amount to a denial of due process or an 'invidious 
discrimination.' Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U. S. 483, 489; Griffin v. Illinois, supra, p. 18. AbsoM 
lute equality is not required; lines can be ancfar'e 
drawn ano we often sustain them." 372 U. S. 
356-357. 
The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines 
of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support 
being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and some of the Due Process 
Clause of that Amendment.8 Neither clause by itself 
8 The Court of Appeab m tlm ca8e, for example, examineq botq 
posHible rat 10nale::;, :-;ta ting : 
"If the holding I of Douglasl be grounded on the equal protection 
clarnw, mequality m thr circumstances of the::.e cases is as obvious as 
it, waH in thr circumstance,; of Douglas. If the holding in DouglG.$ 
were ~roundr<l on the due process clause, and Mr. Justice Harlan in 
d1ssrn(. thought tlw discourse should have been in those terms, due 
process enrompa,;ses rlemrnt,; of rquality. There simply cannot be 
dur prorr8~ of thr law to a II1igant deprivrd of all profrssional assist-, 
ance when other litigant,;, i;imilarly i;ituated, arr able to obtain prof es~ 
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provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result 
reached, each depending on a different inquiry which 
emphasizes differe11t factors. "Due process'' emphasizes 
fairness between the State and the individual dealing 
with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the 
same situation may be treated. "Equal protection," on 
the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a 
State between classes of i11di viduals whose situations arc 
arguably indistinguishable. We will address these issues 
separately in the succeeding sections. 
III 
Recognition of the due process rationale in Douglas is 
found both in the Court's opinion and in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. The Court in Douglas 
stated that " [ w] hen an individual is forced to run this 
gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to 
appeal does not comport with fair procedure." 372 U. S., 
at 357. Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the due process 
issue in Douglas was the only one worthy of extended 
consideration, remarking: "The real question in this case, 
I submit, and the only one that permits of satisfactory 
analysis, 1s whether o~ not the state rule, as applied in 
this case, is consistent with the requirements of fair pro-
cedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause." 372 U.S., 
at 363. 
We do not believe that the Due Process Clause requires 
North Carolina to provide respondent with counse on 
h~ o the , tate Supreme our . 
At the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the right of 
an indigent defendant to counsel at his trial is funda-
s1onal as,nstance and to be benrfited by 1!. Thr sarne concepts of 
fairne:-;;; and equality, whiC'h rrquire counsel in a first appeal of 
nght, rrquire counsrl in other and fmbsequent discretionary appeals." 
483 F. 2d, at 655. 
~-
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lnental and binding upon the States by virtue of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gideon v. Wain-
wri(jht, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). But there are significant 
differences between the trial and appellate stages of a 
· criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage 
from the State's point of view is to convert a critrtinal 
defendant from a person presumed innocent to ohe found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To accomplish thiii 
purpose, the State employs a prosecuting attorn~y who 
presents evidence to the court, challenges any witnesses 
offered by the defendant, argues rulings of the court! 
and makes direct arguments to the court or jury seeking 
to persuade them of the defendant's guilt, Under these 
circumstances " ... reason and reflection require us to 
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.'' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., 
at 344. 
By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than 
the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not 
to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather 
to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury 
below. The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as 
a shield to protect him against being "haled into court" 
by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, 
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination 
of guilt. This difference is significant for, while no one 
would agree that the State may simply dispense with the 
trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant's 
consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any 
appeal at all. M cKane v. Durston, supra. The fact 
tTiat an a1jpeal has been provided does not automatically 
mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to pro~ 
vide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the 
10 
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way. Douglas v. California, supra. Unfairness results 
only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied 
meaningful access to that system because of their poverty. 
I ' That question is more profitably considered under a 
/ equal protection analysis. 
I IV 
Language invoking equal protection notions is promi-
nent both in Douglas and in other cases treating the 
rights of indigents on appeal. The Court in Douglas, 
for example, stated : 
"[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an 
indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of 
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been 
drawn between rich and poor." (Emphasis in 
original.) 372 U. S., at 357. 
The Court in Burns v. Ohio, supra, stated the issue in the 
following terms: 
"Once the state chooses to establish appellate review 
in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from 
access to any phase of that procedure because of their 
poverty '' 360 U. S., at 257. 
II 
Despite the tendency of all rights "to declare them-
selves absolute to their logical extreme," 0 there are ob-
viously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis 
may not be pressed without doing violence to principles 
recognized in other decisions of this Court. The Four-
teenth Amendment "does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages," San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U. S. 1, 24 ( 1973), nor 
does it require the State to "equalize economic condi-
tions." Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 23 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). It does require that the state appellate sys-
u Hudson Water Co. v McCorter, 209 U. S. 349, B55 (1908). 
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tern be "free of unreasoned distinctions," Rinaldi v. 
Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305, 310 ( 1966), and that indigents have 
an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly 
within the adverserial system. Griffin v. California, 
supra,' Draper v. Washington, supra. The State cAnnot 
adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant "en• 
tirely cut off from any appeal at all," by virtue of hia 
indigency, Lane v. BrJwn, supra, at 481, nor extend to 
such indigent defendants merely a "meaningless ritual'' 
while others in better economic circumstances have a 
"n1eaningful appeal." Douglas v. California, supra, at 
~ \ 358. The question is not one of absolutes, but one of 
I degrees. In this case we do not believe that the Equal 
Protection Clause, when interpreted in the context of 
these cases, requires North Carolina to provide free 
counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discre~ 
tionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or 
to file petitions for review in this Court. 
A. The North Carolina appellate system, as are the 
appellate systems of almost half the States,1° is multi-
tiered, providing for both an intermediate Court of Ap-
peals and a Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals was 
created effective January 1, 1967, and, like other state 
courts of appeals, was intended to absorb a substantial 
share of the case load previously burdening the Supreme 
Court. In g iminal cases, an appeal as of right lies di-
rectly to the Supreme Court in all cases which involve a 
s~~or life imprisonment, whilean appeal 
ofrigh t in allotner criminal cases lies to the Court of 
Appeals. N. C. Gen. Stat. ~ 7 A-27. A second appeal 
of right lies to the Supreme Court in any criminal case 
" ( 1) [ w J hich directly involves a substantial question aris-
ing under the Constitution of the United States or of this 
State, or (2) [i]n which there is a dissent, , . ," N, C, 
l O See Brief for n espondrnt, p. 9 n, 5, 
12 
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Rev. Stat. ~ 7 A- 30. All other decisions of the Court of 
Appeals on direct review of criminal cases may be further 
reviewed in the Supreme Court on a discretionary basis. 
The statute governing discretionary appeals to the 
Supreme Court is N. C. Rev. Stat. ¾ 7 A-31. This statute 
. provides, in relevant part, that "[i] n any cause in which 
appeal has been taken to the Court of Appeals ... the 
Supreme Court may in its discretion, on motion of any 
party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause 
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after 
it has been determined by the Court of Appeals." The 
statute further provides that "[ij f the cause is certified 
for transfer to the Supreme Court after its determination 
by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals." The choice of cases 
to be reviewed is not left entirely within the discretion of 
the Supreme Court but is regulated by statutory stand-
ards. Subsection ( c) of this provision states: 
" Iu causes subject to certification under subsec-
tion (a) of this section, certification may be made by 
the Supreme Court after determination of the cause 
by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court ( 1) The subject matter of the appeal 
has significant public interest, or (2) The cause in-
volves legal principles of major significance to the 
jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of 
the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in con-
flict with a decision of the Supreme Court." 
Appointment of counsel for indigents in North Caro-
lina is governed by N. C. Rev. Stat. ¾ 7 A-450 et seq. 
These provisions, although perhaps 011 their face broad 
enough to cover appointments such as respondent sought 
here. 11 have generally been construed to limit the right to 
11 For C'xampl<' , ~ubsectwn (b) (H) of § 7A-451, effective at 
thr tunC' of rr1:,pouclrnt'~ apJ)oaJ1:,, providei; for counsel on "I d]irect 
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appornted counsel 111 criminal cases to direct appeals 
\ 
taken as of right. Thus North Carolina has followed the 
mandate of Douglas v. California, supra, and authorized 
appointment of counsel for a convicted defendant appeal-
ing to the intermediate court of appeals. but has not 
gone beyond Douglas to provide for llppdintment of 
counsel for a defendant who seeks eithElt discretionary 
review in the Suprei11e Court of North Car(;Jlina dr a writ 
of certiorari here. 
B. The facts show that respondent, in connection with 
his Mecklenburg County conviction, received the benefit 
of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in 
preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state 
Court of Appeals. Thus, prior to his seeking discretion-
] 
ary review in the State Supreme Court, his claims "had 
once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an 
appellate court." Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S., 
at 356. We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, 
that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied 
meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court 
simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid 
him in seeking review in that court. At that stage he 
will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record 
of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of 
Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many 
cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his 
_. case. These materials, supplemented by whatever sub-
m1ss1011 respondent may make pro se would appear to 
,provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an 
review of any Judgment or decree, including review by the United 
State,- Supreme Court of final judgment;; rendered by the highest 
court of North Carolina in which deciswn may be had." But this 
prov1"1011 npparently ha~ not been construed to allow coum,rl for 
pc•rm1~~1ve appellate procrdurc~. See Moffitt v Ross, 483 F . 2d 6501 
G52 (Hm) . 
14 
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,adequate basis on which to base its decision to grant or 
(
deny review. 
I We are fortified in this conclusion by our understand-
. ing of the function served by discretionary review in the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. The critical issue in that 
court, as we perceive it, is not whether there has been "a 
correct adjudication of guilt'' in every individual case, see 
Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351 U. S., at 18, but rather 
whether "the subject matter of the appeal has significant 
public interest,'' whether "the cause involves legal prin-
ciples of major significance to the jurisprudence of the 
state,'' or whether the decision below is in probable con-
flict with a decision of the Supreme Court. The Su. 
preme Court may deny certiorari even though it believes 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect, 
see Peasley v. Virginia, Iron Coal Coke Co., 282 N. C. 585, 
194 S. E. 2d 133 ( 1973), since a decision which appears 
incorrect may nevertheless fail to satisfy any of the cri-
teria discussed above. Once a defendant's claims of error 
are organized and presented in a lawyer-like fashion to 
the Court of Appeals, the justices of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina who make the decision to grant or deny 
discretionary review should be able to ascertain whether 
his case satisfies the standards established by the legisla-
ture for such review. 
This is not to say, of course, that a skilled lawyer, 
particularly one trained in the somewhat arcane art of 
preparing petitions for discretionary review, would not 
prove helpful to any litigant able to employ him. An 
indigent defendant seeking review in the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina is therefore somewhat handicapped in 
comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel 
assisting him in every conceivable manner at every stage 
in the proceedi11g. But both the opportunity to have 
·counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals 
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and the nature of 1scretionary review in the Supreme 
Court of North rolina make this relative handicap far 
ndicap borne by the indigent defendant 
denied counse on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas, 
And the fac that a particular service might be of bene· 
fit to an in igent defendant does not mean that the servu 
ice is con titutionally required./ The duty of the State 
under ou cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that 
may be ,,1,,1,ti--~ by a~ criminal defendan~ i1~ 
pursuit..!.of .appellate .-su-gooss-, but only to assure the indi-
gent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his 
claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process\ 
We think respondent was given that opportunity under 
the existing North Carolina system. 
V 
Much of the discussion in the preceding section is 
equally relevant to the question of whether a State must 
provide counsel for a defendant seeking review of his 
conviction in this Court. North Carolina will have pro" 
vided counsel for a convicted defendant's only appeal as 
of right, and the brief prepared by that counsel together 
with one and perhaps two North Carolina appellate 
opinions will be available to this Court in order that it 
may decide whether or not to grant certiorari. This 
Court's review, much like that of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, is discretionary and depends on numer" 
ous factors other than the perceived correct"ness of the 
judgment we are asked to review. 
There is also a significant difference between the source 
0f the right to seek discretionary review in the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina and the source of the right to 
seek discretionary review in this Court. The former is 
conferred by the statutes of the State of North Carolina, 
hut the latter is granted by statutes enacted by Congress, 
1G 
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Thus the argument relied upon in the Griffin and Douglas 
cases. that the State having once created a right of appeal 
must give all persons an equal opportunity to enjoy the 
right, is by its terms inapplicable. The right to seek 
certiorari in this Court is not granted by any State, and 
exists by virtue of federal statute with or without the 
consent of the State whose judgment is sought to be 
reviewed. 
The suggestion that a State is responsible for providing 
counsel to one petitioning this Court simply because it 
initiated the prosecution which led to the judgment 
sought to be reviewed is unsupported by either reason or 
authority. It would be quite as logical under the ration-
ale of Douglas and Griffin, and indeed perhaps more so, 
to require that the Federal Government or this Court 
furnish and compensate counsel for petitioners who seek 
certiorari here to review state judgments of conviction. 
Yet this Court has followed a consistent policy of deny-
ing applications for appointment of counsel by persons 
seeking to file jurisdictional statements or petitions for 
certiorari in this Court. See, e. g., Drum v. California, 
373 U. S. 947 (1963); Mooney v. New York, 353 U. S. 
047 (1963); Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U. S. 819 
(1963). In the light of these authorities, it would be 
odd, indeed, to read the Fourteenth Amendment to 
impose such a requirement on the States, and we decline 
to rlo so. 
5> VI 
We do not mean by this opinion to in any way discour-
age those States which have. as a matter of legislative 
choice, made counsel available to convicted defendants at 
all stages of appeal. Some States which might well choose 
to do so as a matter of legislative policy may conceivably 
find that other claims for public funds within or without 
the criminal justice system preclude the implementation 
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of such a policy at the present time. North Carolina, 
for example, while it does not provide counsel to indigent 
defendants seeking discretionary review on appeal, does 
provide counsel for indige11t prisoners in several situ~ 
atious where such appointments are not required by any 
constitutional decision of this Court.u Our reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment leaves these choices to the 
State, and respondent was denied no right secured by the 
Federal Constitution when North Carolina refused to 
provide counsel to aid him in obtaining discretionary 
appellate review. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the 
contrary is 
Reversed, 
12 Section 7 A-451 (a) of thP N, C. General Statutes provides: 
" (a) An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the 
following actions and procPeding,s: 
" (l) Any felony ca:se, and any miHdemeanor case for which the 
authonzed punishment exceed:; six months imprisonment or a five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) fine; 
"(2) A hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
' chapter 17 of the General Stat11tes; 
"(~) A post-conviction prorE'<'ding 11ndrr chapter 15 of the General 
Statutes; 
"(4) A hearing for revocation of probation, if counsel was pro• 
vided at trial or 1f confinement of more than six months 18 possible as 
a re;;ult of the !waring ; 
" (5) A hearmg m which extradit1011 to another state is sought; 
'' (6) A proceeding for judicrnl hospitalization under chapter 122, 
article 11 (Mentally Ill Criminal:;), of the General Statute:;; 
"(7) A civil arrest and bail proceeding under chapter 1, article 34, 
of the General Statutes; and 
" (8) In the ca:se of a Juvenile, a hearing as a result of which 
commitment to an institution or transfer to the superior court for 
trial on a felony chargr is possible." 
,. 
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Suggested substitute for next to last sentence 
' ~ .>, l" 
in Part IV. (p. 15) 
"The duty of the State under our cases 
is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that 
may be privately retained by a criminal 
defendant in a continuing effort to reverse 
his conviction, but only to assure the 
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity 
to present his claims fairly in the context 
of the State's appellate process." 
{ K"~ '>,; ,,; 
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